Last week, two routine technical upgrades disrupted office operations and air travel across multiple continents within just 24 hours. One incident was caused by a network configuration change, the other by a router installation. Both demonstrated how reliance on third-party suppliers can turn routine maintenance into a major operational crisis.
The episode raises a question that is sometimes considered, but often beyond the reach of any business continuity plan: how do organisations maintain resilience when a handful of suppliers can determine whether it can function on any given day; how is supplier risk managed?
Our colleagues at Moore Australia, part of the Moore Global network, examine the causes of these disruptions, international approaches to supplier risk management, and practical steps businesses can take to strengthen operational resilience.
Two failures with the same starting point: a supplier
On Thursday 12 November (UTC), users began to lose access to Exchange Online, the Microsoft service that underpins Outlook. Within hours the disruption had cascaded to Teams, SharePoint, Copilot and parts of Microsoft’s recovery remained incomplete in some regions on Saturday 14 November. Microsoft characterised the incident as “a technical issue”. Its preliminary root cause analysis attributes the failure to traffic shifts during standard network maintenance. Network maintenance managed by a supplier.
Concurrently, on Friday 13 November, at about 3.30pm US Eastern time, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) imposed a nationwide ground stop. According to the FAA, its legacy equipment destabilised when data began flooding its telecommunications network and the instability propagated to 17 of its 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC’s). Its initial investigation attributes the fault to a radio site in Arkansas, where its network provider, a supplier, had been installing a new router; a necessary upgrade initially considered “pretty straightforward”.
In both cases, the failure originated in infrastructure that the affected organisations did not own, nor operate, and organisations internationally discovered that their daily operations hinged on third party suppliers, one entirely invisible to them and beyond their influence.
How is supplier risk regulated?
Each major market regulates supplier risk under its own regulatory framework, and the fundamental expectations have converged. Supplier risk often considers the risk that a supplier behaves badly, that they are unethical, not that they can’t deliver. Regulated organisations must identify which suppliers their critical services depend on, and they remain accountable when one of those suppliers fails. Each region calibrates those obligations differently.
European Supervisory Authorities designated 19 critical ICT third-party providers under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited among them, and subjected them to direct oversight. [1] Treasury designated the same Microsoft entity a Critical Third Party to the UK financial sector with effect from 13 July 2026. [2] In the regulators’ announcement, FCA Chief Executive Nikhil Rathi observed in July of 2026 that “when the same providers serve thousands of firms, a single failure can reverberate across the financial system”. The Bank of England emphasised that the regime leaves intact each firm’s own responsibility for due diligence, risk and contingency planning. [3]
Asian regulators anchor their frameworks in dependency mapping on the premise that disruption is inevitable. The Singapore and Hong Kong Monetary Authority’ respectively expect financial institutions to identify potential single points of failure early, to map each critical business service’s dependencies on people, processes, technology and third parties, and to manage concentration risk. The Singaporean Cybersecurity Amendment Act 2024 mandates stringent third-party dependency management. India and Japan’s Financial Services Agency and Reserve Bank respectively have adopted a comparable stance.
Australia operates overlapping regimes. APRA’s Prudential Standard CPS 230 (Operational Risk Management) requires banks, insurers and superannuation trustees to sustain critical operations through severe disruption and to govern service provider risk. The Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 layers on a risk management program for owners of critical assets in sectors ranging from energy and water to hospitals and data processing, and its rules impose specific obligations for supply chain hazards. The Cyber Security Act 2024 strengthens national cyber governance across supply chains and third-party vendors guiding organisations to identify cyber supply chain risks to understand the full chain of software dependency.
Across the Tasman, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s outsourcing policy (BS11) obliges large banks to demonstrate that their outsourcing arrangements would not compromise their capacity to manage the failure of a service provider. [4]
“A supplier’s cyber weakness can quickly become your operational crisis. The question is no longer simply whether a vendor has passed a security assessment, but whether you understand the full chain of dependency, can detect when that risk changes, and have tested how you will respond if a critical supplier is compromised. Good supplier risk management goes well beyond contracting.” — Wilson Tang, Director, Governance and Risk Advisory, Moore Australia.
Gulf regulators have embedded supplier risk in their outsourcing rules for banks. The Central Bank of the UAE’s Outsourcing Regulation for Banks stipulates that outsourcing arrangements must neither diminish a bank’s ability to meet its obligations to customers nor impede the central bank’s supervision. In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Central Bank’s Rules on Outsourcing oblige banks to secure the central bank’s written no-objection before entering into a material outsourcing arrangement. [5]
North American regulators place particular emphasis on accountability. The Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate (FDIC) and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued joint guidance stating that a bank’s use of third parties does not diminish its responsibility to operate in a safe and sound manner, to the same extent as if the activity were performed in-house. Canada’s prudential regulator, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), applies Guideline B-10, categorizing overreliance on a single third party as a form of concentration risk and expects prompt notification when a third-party arrangement affects a firm’s ability to deliver critical operations. [6]
The community at the end of the chain
“When an outage hits, my first thought is for the person at the end of the chain. A system failure can mean a patient can’t collect a critical prescription, or a woman seeking protection from family violence suddenly has to navigate a paper-based process. Government and community service providers need to know how they will continue reaching vulnerable people when critical technology fails. Our community depends on it.” — Rochelle Hawkins, Director, Governance and Risk Advisory.
What the frameworks have in common
These frameworks are merely a selection of the regulations in place globally. Read side by side, they share a consistent foundation; organisations are expected to map which critical services depend on which suppliers, including those suppliers’ subcontractors, to assess concentration where many services or many firms rely on a single provider, and to maintain business continuity and exit arrangements for critical suppliers. Throughout, the organisation that relies on a supplier remains accountable for the service its customers depend on.
“European regulators named Microsoft’s Ireland operations a critical provider to the financial sector a year ago, and the UK followed in July. Under both regimes, the bank, insurer or exchange that relies on Microsoft remains answerable for its own services. Every organisation, regulated or not, should adopt the same discipline: identify which critical services run through a single provider, test the consequences when that provider fails, and formalise the fallback and exit arrangements in the contract.” — Dr. Oliver Bungartz, Head of Risk Advisory Services, Moore BRL, Germany.
These rules predominantly govern banks, insurers, superannuation and pension funds and market infrastructure, together with operators of designated critical infrastructure. The majority of the organisations disrupted last week fall outside their scope, including government departments, health services, tourism, councils, courts, schools, professional firms, exporters and small businesses and more.
For those entities, supplier concentration is a governance responsibility for the board, and the regulated sector’s approach provides a practical template. But all organisations have suppliers, and supplier risk.
“The boards I work with can usually identify their critical suppliers, and they seldom hear in advance when those suppliers schedule significant changes. Last week demonstrated that a supplier’s maintenance window is a board-level risk. If a routine upgrade at someone else’s facility can halt your organisation for a day, that dependency warrants a designated owner on your risk register and a workaround your people have rehearsed.” — Michelle Shafizadeh, Director, Governance and Risk Advisory.
Questions for your next board meeting
These questions examine whether existing plans rest on supplier assumptions that last week’s events invalidated.
- How do we manage supplier risk?
- Which of our critical services would halt if a single provider’s email, identity or collaboration platform were unavailable for 24 hours?
- Do we know when our critical suppliers implement significant changes, and do our contracts oblige them to notify us?
- Where have sign-in, approvals or customer contact come to depend on email without deliberate design?
- When did we last exercise a manual fallback, and did the people who would depend on it participate?
- What restoration priority would our supplier assign us, and is that commitment formally documented?
- When employees improvise during an outage, which workarounds are sanctioned, and which introduce additional security or privacy exposures?
Looking ahead
Microsoft and the FAA restored their services within days, and the dependencies that transformed two technical faults into international events remain entrenched.
Reflecting and acting on this, the most valuable step is to compressively consider and assess – what is our supplier risk? And establish which suppliers an organisation cannot operate without, and to test candidly what happens when one of them falters.
About the Authors
This article was prepared by experts from Moore Australia, a member of the Moore Global network, specialising in governance and risk management.
Rochelle Hawkins — Director at Moore Australia in Melbourne. She advises government and non-government organisations on governance, risk, compliance and assurance.
Michelle Shafizadeh — Partner at Moore Australia, leading the Governance and Risk Advisory practice. She has over 31 years of experience across consulting firms and the public sector, specialising in risk management, internal controls and audit.
Wilson Tang — Head of the Governance and Risk Advisory practice at Moore Australia. He helps leadership teams strengthen their governance and risk management frameworks.
Original article: Supplying the Risk: The Day a Supplier Stopped the World, published by Moore Australia, a member of the Moore Global network.














